North Korea Nuclear Crisis -
PART I: Chronology of Events Leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework

12 April 1991: South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-ku announces that South Korea will attack North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon if it does not sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korean President Kim Il-sung says that the announcement is a "virtual declaration of war."

1992

30 January 1992: North Korea signs the IAEA safeguards agreement. North Korea’s Deputy Minister for the atomic energy industry Hong Gun-pyo says that North Korea will abide by the agreement fully.

24 March 1992: North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Ri Tcheul says that North Korea has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he says that North Korea will soon accept IAEA inspections.

12 April 1992: North Korean President Kim Il-sung says that North Korea is willing to receive international inspectors at its nuclear facilities and all that needs to be arranged is the procedural formality of informing the IAEA.

4 May 1992: Twenty-five days before schedule, North Korea supplies the IAEA with a 150-page "initial report" declaring its nuclear facilities and materials. The report, however, does not list the actual amount of plutonium North Korea has reprocessed at Yongbyon. IAEA produced a report stating the facilities and materials North Korea admits to having. This list closely matches Western estimates of the scope of North Korea’s nuclear program.

25 May – 7 June 1992: The first IAEA inspection team led by Willi Theis came to North Korea

19 June 1992: The IAEA announces that it plans to undertake special inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that North Korea has agreed to such inspections.

6 July 1992: IAEA inspectors begin a second round of international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities

31 August 1992: The third IAEA inspection team arrives in North Korea. During the inspection, the team is given limited access to two suspected nuclear-related sites at Yongbyon. North Korea had not declared the sites in the report submitted to the IAEA in May 1992. One of the sites is a two-story building. They are permitted limited access to the building, which is found to house heavy weapons, including tanks and missiles on mobile carriages. The North Koreans refuse to allow a formal and thorough inspection of the building based on grounds that it is a military site and thus exempt from inspection. The IAEA, however, does not accept such exemptions.

18 September 1992: According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities.

4 November 1992: US and South Korea announced plans for "Team Spirit"military exercises. The North Korean foreign ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea may stop IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities if South Korea and the United States do not terminate their joint Team Spirit military exercises.

December 1992: The IAEA team conducts its fifth inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

1993

13 January 1993: According to the Information Director of the IAEA, North Korea will shut down its 5MW reactor around the middle of 1993 to change the core. IAEA inspectors are expected to be there when the reactor is shut down.

26 January-6 February 1993: The IAEA team conducts its sixth inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.

29 January 1993: North Korea’s ambassador to Russia, Son Song-pil, warns that the US and South Korean Team Spirit military exercise scheduled for March 1993 may force North Korea to close its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. He says that North Korea views the exercises as preparation for a potential nuclear war and that they are incompatible with the basic clauses of the NPT. Additionally, the situation does not allow North Korea "to normally fulfill its commitments" to IAEA inspections

8 February 1993: North Korea publicly states that it might take "countermeasures of self-defense" if the United States and other countries press for inspections of certain facilities in North Korea

11 February 1993: IAEA Director General Hans Blix formally requests North Korea to open two undeclared sites for special inspections. South Korean Prime Minister Hyun Soong-jong announces that South Korea will cancel the scheduled Team Spirit military exercises with the United States if North Korea agrees to the special inspections demanded by the IAEA.

21 February 1993: North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Choe Hak-kun informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will not allow special inspections of the two sites suspected of storing nuclear waste.

22 February 1993: North Korea’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ri Tcheul, states that North Korea has the right to "tear up" the IAEA safeguards agreement if inspectors continue to demand access to the two disputed sites in North Korea.

22-29 February 1993: During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the North Korean representatives are shown US surveillance photographs and chemical evidence proving that North Korea had been producing plutonium from nuclear waste for a minimum of three years beginning in 1989. Diplomatic officials believe that North Korea now has enough plutonium to build at least one nuclear weapon.

8 March 1993: In a message to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, North Korea refuses once again to accept special inspections of its suspected sites. Its reason for doing so is the Team Spirit military exercises and the "state of semi-war" in the country. IAEA Director General Hans Blix rejects North Korea’s "excuses" and repeats the inspection demand.

12 March 1993: North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the NPT. It cites the treaty’s escape clause on defending supreme national interests. North Korea’s two reasons for withdrawing are: (1) the Team Spirit "nuclear war rehearsal" military exercises, and (2) the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites.

17 March 1993: The IAEA Board of Governors meets to discuss North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, as well as the line of action it should now take.

22 March 1993: North Korea claims that the two suspected sites are "non-nuclear military installations" and charges the IAEA of spying on it for the United States. The IAEA sets 31 March as the deadline for North Korea to comply with inspections.

25 March 1993: North Korea ignores the deadline for IAEA inspections of two of its undeclared sites. According to North Korea, the sites are military facilities, which are unrelated to its nuclear program. The IAEA says that it will refer the matter to the UN Security Council.

31 March 1993: North Korea refuses to allow inspections of two suspected sites at Yongbyon

1 October 1993: The IAEA General Assembly passes a resolution that calls on North Korea to "cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement."

27 October 1993: North Korea tells the United States that it will submit to regular IAEA inspections only if the United States cancels Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea.

2 November 1993: A high-ranking US official says that the Team Spirit military maneuvers will continue in 1994 if North Korea does not submit to regular IAEA inspections.

November 1993: The United States offers to assist North Korea with monitoring personnel and technical support for the upcoming refueling of the North Korean 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon. It also offers to replace North Korea's gas-cooled reactors with US light-water reactors if the latter provides the IAEA with blanket access to its nuclear facilities

30 November 1993: North Korea's foreign ministry suggests that North Korea will withdraw from the NPT if the United States does not agree to third round of negotiations on the nuclear issue.

3 December 1993: North Korea offers the IAEA unlimited access to five of its seven declared nuclear facilities and limited access to the other two - a 5MW gas-graphite reactor and a reprocessing facility. North Korea says that the IAEA can replace the film and batteries in the cameras but not check the seals at these facilities. North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA Yun Ho-jin says that the nuclear issue can be resolved if the United States agrees with North Korea on a package involving an improvement in bilateral relations.

6 December 1993: US President Bill Clinton and the IAEA announce that North Korea's offer to allow the IAEA access to some of its nuclear sites is inadequate and unacceptable. IAEA spokesman David Kyd says that "there must be unrestricted access to all declared sites" and that "restrictions on the two facilities are not negotiable."

8 December 1993: The United States and South Korea accept North Korea's offer to allow the expansion of inspections beyond the replacement of maintenance and surveillance equipment in return for a third round of nuclear talks.

1994

4 January 1994: US officials say that they are likely to make the important concession of accepting North Korea's proposal of a complete one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear facilities, in the hope that additional inspections can be agreed upon in the future.

1 April 1994: North Korea's foreign ministry states that the nuclear inspection dispute can be settled in direct talks with the United States, and declines a Russian proposal to resolve the matter at a world conference.

27 April 1994: North Korea announces that it will not accept full IAEA inspections. Although IAEA inspectors will be permitted to witness the removal of the nuclear spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, they will not be allowed to take samples of the rods or to measure their radioactivity.

14 May 1994: North Korea starts unloading spent fuel rods from its 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon before the arrival of the IAEA inspectors.

16 May 1994: US state department officials announce that if North Korea has removed or "emptied" the spent fuel from the rods, the United States will seek sanctions in the UN Security Council. US defense secretary William Perry characterizes the situation as a "very substantial near-term crisis."

31 May 1994: The IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces North Korea is "no longer [officially] in compliance with IAEA safeguards." IAEA inspectors announce that key fuel rods have already been removed from the original 300 rods that are considered "vital to future measurement." North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin says that 40 rods have been withdrawn under IAEA camera surveillance and placed in a storage site "pending an inspection agreement

7 June 1994: North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho-jin declares that the North Korean government "will never allow inspections" of two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. One of the reasons for not allowing inspections is because the United States discovered the two nuclear sites using spy satellite imagery.

9 June 1994: According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea has removed 6,500 of the original 8,000 fuel rods from the core of its 5MW gas-graphite reactor. Two IAEA inspectors are monitoring the fuel rods in the cooling pond. North Korea is not allowing the IAEA inspectors to take samples from the rods. According to a Western diplomat, the ability to reconstruct North Korea's nuclear history "is now lost."

10 June 1994: The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution suspending technical aid to North Korea.

13 June 1994: North Korea submits a letter officially relinquishing its IAEA membership.

15 June 1994: The IAEA inspectors leave North Korea because they can no longer account for the 8,000 fuel rods.

16 June 1994: North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in his talks with former US President Jimmy Carter, reportedly agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and promises that the IAEA's monitoring equipment will stay in good condition.

23 June 1994: North Korea confirms that it will fully comply with the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allow IAEA inspectors to remain in North Korea, maintain IAEA monitoring equipment in compliance with the NPT, and halt its nuclear activities.

12 July 1994: North Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Kim Su-man announces that IAEA inspectors can remain at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon, and that the recently removed fuel rods will not be processed; neither will the 5MW gas-graphite reactor be refueled.

31 August 1994: North Korea's ambassador to Austria, Kim Gwang-sop says that full inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities shall be forthcoming following the accord reached between North Korea and the United States in Geneva. Kim admits that North Korea has produced plutonium in the past but that its use has been restricted to civilian purposes.

13 September 1994: The IAEA states in a confidential report that inspections of the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon have yielded no evidence that plutonium has been extracted there since 1993. There is suspicion, however, that fuel rods were processed at a second facility where inspections were not allowed.

16 September 1994: As a result of the nuclear accord reached with North Korea, the IAEA will broaden its inspection activities to include all seven of North Korea's declared nuclear sites. IAEA inspectors will verify that the 8,000 spent fuel rods removed from the 5MW gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon are not reprocessed until definite steps are taken to freeze the nuclear program. The IAEA announces that its inspectors have begun replacing the batteries and videotapes in surveillance equipment in all seven declared nuclear facilities.

21 October 1994: The United States and North Korea sign an accord (Agreed Framework), which specifies the actions that both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light-water reactors.

The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online.

Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers.

Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT.

It will also allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities.

1 November 1994: A spokesman for North Korea's foreign ministry says that North Korea is taking "practical steps" to implement the Agreed Framework with the United States.

North Korea's Administration Council has ordered the cessation of construction on the 50MW and 200MW gas-graphite reactors.

The Council has also decided to halt operation of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to take measures to withdraw fuel rods that were intended for refueling it.

In addition, North Korea will continue to cease operations at its radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and other nuclear facilities.

4 November 1994: The UN Security Council endorses the nuclear accord reached between North Korea and the United States in October 1994. It approves North Korea's voluntary decision to freeze its current nuclear program and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea rejects the statement on the ground that it only emphasizes North Korea's responsibilities under the framework agreement.

NEXT - PART II : Unravelling of the Agreed Framework .... watch this space....

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