History Repeats Itself: Lessons of Iraq NEVER Learnt
by - Not to express a national consensus on democracy, - But to solidify our control over the country. - A heightening of the divisive tendencies already inherent in Iraqi - A devaluation of the very concept of representative
William R. Polk
Read here full article "The Lessons of Iraq We Refuse to Learn" by William Polk
(Mr. Polk taught at Harvard from 1955 to 1961 when he was appointed a member of the Policy Planning Council of the US State Department. In 1965 he became professor of history at the University of Chicago and founded its Middle Eastern Studies Center. Subsequently, he also became president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. Among his books are The United States and the Arab World, The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century, Neighbors and Strangers: the Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs and the just-published Understanding Iraq. )
April 14, 2005
Edited article:
Are there any lessons to be learned by the American venture into Iraq?
Writing about the Vietnam war, the neo-conservative American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington suggested that it would be best if policy makers “simply blot out of their mind any recollection of this one.”
It seems to me that they DID.
So, in at least some ways, the Iraq war has been proof of George Santayana’s admonition that, having done so, we were doomed to repeat it.
The urgent question today is, will the Iraq war itself be similarly blotted out and similarly repeated?
Mr. Huntington’s argument was based on the notion that Vietnam was unique since, as he saw it, imperialism and colonialism have “just about disappeared from world politics.” That is, they were fading memories of a now irrelevant past.
But is this true?
Foreign domination has faded from our memory but NOT from the memories of many of the peoples of Asia and Africa.
FOCUS ON IRAQ
Iraq became “independent” by treaty with Britain in 1922.
Then it became “independent” by recognition of the League of Nations in 1932. But few Iraqis believe that it became really independent by either of these acts.
Britain controlled the economy and maintained a military presence while it continued to rule Iraq behind a façade of governments it had appointed. It then reoccupied the country during World War II. After the war it ruled through a proxy until he was overthrown in 1958.
So was 1958 the date of independence?
On the surface yes, but below the surface American and British intelligence manipulated internal forces and neighboring states to influence or dominate governments; they helped to overthrow the revolutionary government of Abdul Karim Qasim and to install the Baath party which brought Saddam Husain to power.
Knowing what they had done and fearing that they would do so again, shaped much of the policy even of Saddam Husain.
By giving or withholding money, arms and vital battlefield intelligence, Britain and America influenced what Saddam thought he could do.
So worried was he about his American connection that, before he decided to invade Kuwait, he called in the U.S. ambassador to ask, in effect, if the invasion was ok with Washington. Only when he was assured in 1990 that the U.S. had no policy on the frontiers with Kuwait by official testimony before Congress, government press releases and a face-to-face meeting with our ambassador in Baghdad did he act.
Either he misread the omens or we changed them. Our ambassador later said, incredibly, that we had NOT anticipated that he would take ALL of Kuwait.
When he did, we invaded, destroyed much of his army and the Iraqi economy and imposed upon the country UN-authorized sanctions and unauthorized “no-fly” zones.
Finally, in 2003 we invaded again, occupied the country and imposed upon it a government of our choice.
Whatever the justification for any or all of these actions, they do not add up to independence. So even Iraqis who hated and feared Saddam always felt that they were living under a form of Western control.
The simple fact is that the “memories” had NOT faded because they were based on current reality.
There are many things to be said about the American invasion and occupation of Iraq.
But one thing stands out above all to me as a historian:
CONSTITUTION
Constitutions are surely “good.”
We believe that other countries should have them because they are the bedrock of democracy. At the end of the First World War, the British made giving the Iraqis one a high priority.
Experts were called in, phrases were debated, studies were made of the best then in operation, and finally, in 1924, a wonderful document emerged. It was greeted with great satisfaction but mainly by those who had given it, the British.
Iraqis paid it little heed because it was not grounded in the realities of Iraqi society, practices or even hopes.
Time after time, governments came into power that overturned or simply neglected every paragraph it contained.
So what did the American occupation government do? Was it aware of this history?
Apparently not.
It set about writing a new constitution.
The occupation authorities wrote the constitution without any Iraqi input and just handed it to their appointed interim government.
That, to my mind, amounted to astonishing insensitivity.
Somehow it never occurred to the American lawyers who wrote it that it would become worthless, that is, illegal, when the interim administration was replaced by even a quasi-independent government. It was surely the shortest-lived constitution ever written.
ELECTIONS
If constitutions are necessary for democracies, elections are even more so.
Iraq had to have one. Organizing and controlling it turned out to be a difficult task.
Many Iraqis interpreted “our” election to mean:
Because at least some Iraqis were determined to get us out of their country, using guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorism against us and those Iraqis who supported us, we had to use our military forces to set parameters on the issues, the personnel and the form of this expression of freedom.
The elections were held was hailed as a great victory for democracy.
I remain unconvinced.
I suspect that two fatal flaws will soon become evident:
society and
government.
What we have done (is) in the name of security, (but) our critics in Iraq have sought sovereignty. We believed that security had to come first.
A close reading of history leads me to believe that the order is usually the reverse.
When foreigners get out, insurgencies stop; they do not stop, no matter how massive the force used against them or how costly in blood and treasure the cost of fighting is, until the foreigners leave. This surely is the lesson of Ireland, Çeçhneya, Algeria, and even of our own Revolution.
I predict it will be of Iraq too.
Believing that security comes first has led our government to concentrate on rebuilding an Iraqi army since doing so appeared to offer security at a bargain price.
But, Iraqis remember the terrible costs to their society of the creation of armies. The one the British created, time after time, subverted or overthrew civil governments. A new army, absent balancing civic institutions, which can grow only slowly and by internal developments, will surely again pave the way for a military dictatorship.
OTHER LESSONS
What happened to Iraq showed other governments that they live at the sufferance of the United States. Iraq could not defend itself; nor can most other states.
Indeed, we were supplying him with the components and equipment to make weapons of mass destruction right up to the time of our intervention.
Surely, this “lesson” is in the minds of the Persians today as it was in the minds of the Russians, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis and Israelis.
Finally, there is a grab-bag of other lessons again laid before us by Iraq:
The only sensible policy is one that aims to stop them not to win them. Hegel and Santayana may be right, we may NOT learn, but certainly, Huntington is wrong in urging that we “blot” the lessons out of our minds.
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